OK, it’s official. Oracle will acquire Sun Microsystems by the end of the summer. Although I have to give Oracle kudos for a brilliant strategic acquisition (and tweaking IBM’s nose for good measure), flipping the Sun.com site into the Oracle paradigm won’t be as easy as its other acquisitions.

I’ve watched Oracle for about 30 years as an industry analyst — which means I’ve had a front row seat for all of Oracle’s growth, and most of its acquisitions.

When acquisitions are the issue, the script has always been pretty much the same. Oracle announces its intent to purchase an IT industry firm, engages in various firefights with a bevy of aggrieved CEOs and shareholders, occasionally spends some quality time with the SEC, finally closes the deal — and then takes the acquired company’s Website off the airwaves about two nanoseconds after the ink on the deal dries.

Generally, the first iteration of this process is a bit ham handed. Forget preserving the acquired company’s Web prowess & knowledge, brand, share of mind, or easing customers into a new parent organization. The acquired company’s URL is instantly directed to a landing page deep inside Oracle.com that announces the acquisition, positions the company’s products within Oracle’s strategic roster, points visitors to support, and  waxes poetic about Oracle’s commitment to existing customers who have, more often than not, been in the nail biting, front row seats of a less-than-friendly acquisition. Nothing like a bit of drama to create customer angst.

To Oracle’s credit, its “cut to the chase” Web techniques have worked well for the company. How many of you can remember J.D. Edwards core value proposition or market segment? Stumped? How about PeopleSoft or Siebel? OK, let’s try BEA. The lesson here is, of course, simple. There’s no percentage in delaying the inevitable when a company becomes part of bigger parent’s portfolio.

Sun — a horse of a different color

To date, Oracle.com has successfully integrated software companies that are leaders in secondary (albeit attractive) markets that map to Oracle’s strategic product & market growth objectives — and, in relative terms, are the size of a newt. That’s not Sun Microsystems. At $13 billion, Sun is neither the size a newt — or a pure play software company. Rather, it is a purveyor of boutique-class, high performance servers and storage systems that appeal to a loyal and highly vocal constituency (think Apple, here), services that support these systems — and a portfolio of software applications that are open source-centric, nominally priced (think Open Office), or can be downloaded for free (not Oracle’s business model). Add to the mix a community of developers and partners who are committed to Sun’s vision of the industry as it should be (rather than where it is or is actually going), and you have all of the elements of an acquisition built on oil and water. And that just one reason why the Oracle.com team has its hands full.

Which tail will wag the dog?

Although Oracle presents its acquisition decision in terms of its corporate strategic advantage in acquiring a company that owns the lighting-fast servers that are the preferred platforms for its database applications, and huge upsides related to owning the powerful Java platform, the fact is that Oracle.com is, and has always been, a site optimized around marketing and selling software applications. Although behaviors are notably better than observed in previous years, Oracle.com is still known for a dearth of product details, over-reliance on contracted third-party endorsements (think paid up white paper mills and analyst opinions for hire), and its tendency to tweak competitors’ noses at every turn.

None of these schemas fit Sun.com’s cultural behaviors that center on customer product reviews, lively developer forums and discussions, community-generated blogs — and more product details than most buyers can use. Think of it as a culture clash between two titans operating in different galaxies — and a battle that Sun.com is likely to lose.

What Oracle can learn from Sun.com

Since ultimate control goes to the victor, what is left are the lessons that can be learned. Given that Oracle.com has never been in the business of selling hardware — much less open-source software that hopefully nudges the converted to the check out counter — here’s four modest proposals from the peanut gallery.

Don’t lose Sun.com’s powerful voice. Although Oracle.com’s marketing voice has improved over time, it still relies heavily on the “we’re great, everyone else agrees, buy us” marketing model. That works when you are one of two 800 pound gorillas in software (the other one being IBM Software Group). Not so effective when you are swimming upstream against other entrenched hardware and storage vendors.

As it turns out, Sun.com has one of the IT industry’s most effective and powerful voices that balances the “geek-speak” technical buyers love with the “big picture” descriptions that ring with business buyers. Oracle would be a fool to fiddle with this voice which has been carefully honed to appeal to Sun’s core buyers.

Use Sun.com’s system pricing and selection schemas to create a competitive advantage. Currently, Sun.com has one of the industry’s most powerful product pricing and sorting/selection schemas — which are notably missing from competitive Websites. It also has world-class configurators and quote systems that are second to none. If Oracle wants to create a product discovery and selection process advantage over competitors (such and IBM and Dell), it should retain and expand these features.

Harness Sun.com’s customer reviews & its crystal clear buying process. IBM.com, HP.com and EMC.com are blissfully unaware of (well, actually ignoring) the power of customer voices and reviews — and the combined Oracle.com and Sun.com can capitalize on this omission. With the exception of Dell, most of Oracle’s new competitors also do a relatively poor job of clarifying how to buy their server and storage products. Here, Oracle can profit from Sun’s fundamental design that encourages visitors to take the next steps — whether that’s contacting a partner, downloading trial software, or signing up to try and buy hardware.

Don’t piss off the natives. Sun has something that Oracle hasn’t encountered with its previous acquisitions — millions of developers and tech heads who are passionate and vocal proponents of Sun’s quixotic (albeit ultimately fatal) vision of how the IT industry should be. That’s not to say that Oracle doesn’t have its own million beanie army. It does. It’s just that its army signed up for the tour of duty and Sun’s got drafted.

Like most draftees, Sun’s developers are in a quandary. Will Oracle discard Sun’s long-standing commitment to open source and industry standards? Which software, hardware and systems will make the cut? As important, how will Sun’s developer communities fare inside one of the industry’s largest and most pragmatic business software entities which values revenue growth and market share over philosophical matters?

If the blogosphere is any indication, there’s plenty of angst to go around. And when developers are uncertain about their future, the first thing they do is stop developing — and the second thing they do is defect.

Although we wouldn’t argue that Oracle’s success hinges on the goodwill of Sun’s developer community, there’s no doubt that these developers are a powerful engine that keeps Sun’s products — including jewels like Java — on the map. Here, Oracle.com (and more precisely the Oracle Technology Network team) could play a vital role in calming the natives.

Rather than following the normal script which calls for Sun’s Java.net, Big Admin, and Sun Developer Network sites to be subsumed into OTN, the smart play would be to lightly re-brand these venues and leave them in place. This approach would avoid dropping Sun’s developers into an entirely new venue that lacks the lively community and Web 2.0 behaviors they are used to and quite frankly, one that performs well below Sun’s developer properties. It would also send a strong message that Oracle values the culture and role of these vital communities — and keep them from defecting to other brands, including IBM.

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